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Graphical abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Process equipment failures play significant roles in most accidents that occur and recur in 
the chemical process industry (CPI). In this study, 50 equipment comprehensive accident 
investigation reports, extracted from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (CSB) and U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were analyzed to 
generate lessons learned. Based on the analysis, the synergy between major hazards i.e. 
fire, explosion, and toxic release has resulted in catastrophic accidents in the CPI. The 
emphasis on procedural equipment failure prevention does not provide sufficient 
hierarchy of controls in the CPI. Balance and integrated accident prevention is required 
to solve human unreliability that often leads to improper problem-solving, inappropriate 
actions, and ill-timed responses. To minimize losses, facilities and equipment should be 
designed and prepared for the worst-case scenario. Moreover, occurrence and 
recurrence of the accidents could be prevented using inclusive and updated 
communication systems through cooperation between various governmental agencies, 
industry players, and the public to disseminate lessons learned and promote safety in the 
industry. 
 
Keywords: Accident prevention; equipment failure; hierarchy of controls; lessons learned 
 
Abstrak 
 
Kegagalan peralatan pemprosesan adalah penyumbang utama kepada kemalangan 
yang berlaku di industri pemprosesan kimia. Kajian ini menganalisa 50 laporan penuh 
penyiasatan kemalangan daripada pusat data CSB dan NTSB. Berdasarkan analisa yang 
dibuat, kejadian kebakaran, letupan, dan pembebasan bahan kimia megakibatkan 
impak kemalangan peralatan yang sangat teruk. Pergantungan kepada kawalan 
kemalangan yang bersifat prosedur tidak mampu mengekang kejadian kemalangan ini. 
Sewajarnya, pihak industry mewujudkan kawalan kemalangan yang bersifat seimbang 
dan menyeluruh untuk mengelakkan kebergantungan kepada manusia yang terdedah 
kepada kesilapan dan ketidakcekapan. Kemudahan dan peralatan hendaklah direka 
untuk menghadapi situasi paling kritikal. Kemalangan ini juga boleh dielakkan dengan 
mempertingkatkan system komunikasi dan kerjasama dengan pelbagai pihak bagi 
menyebar maklumat berkaitan dan membudayakan keselamatan dalam industri. 
 
Kata kunci: Pencegahan kemalangan; kegagalan peralatan; hierarki kawalan, 
pengajaran 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, employing accident databases for 
accident analysis is becoming an active agenda. But, 
little effort has been made to harness the information in 
improving the safety systems and adopted risk 
mitigation measures to prevent future accidents in the 
chemical process industry (CPI) [1]. The application or 
utilization of the lessons learned is progressing slowly in 
the CPI [2]. The slow lessons learned utilization is a result 
from poor accident investigation, analysis and 
reporting [3].Knowledge from these data mining studies 
is poorly disseminated since majority of the research on 
the experience feedback system is related to accident 
investigation only, not on the dissemination of 
information [2-3]. A study by Jacobsson et al. reported 
that only one-third of the accident cases were 
considered as lessons learned on a broader basis. Most 
of the accident analyses provide very case specific 
information and are generally difficult to apply. 
Therefore, accident analyses that provide new findings 
on general knowledge and understanding on accident 
prevention are still greatly lacking, particularly on 
equipment failures [4]. 
Lack of focus is made on technical aspects of the 
equipment since the industry is aiming for cheaper 
procedural accident prevention [3]. As the complexity 
and technologies of the CPI advance, the tendency for 
equipment failures to occur is high. The high production 
and extreme operating conditions in chemical process 
plant tend to damage the equipment. This poor 
operation may lead to disasters. These accidents would 
not only damage the industry in terms of the financial 
losses but also in terms of major regulatory restrictions, 
societal losses and irreversible environmental 
damage.1The capital and operating costs required for 
equipment design modifications at the earlier stages 
are cheaper due to their less complex changes 
compared to the latter stages. Moreover, the reliability 
is also higher during the earlier stages [5]. Thus, this 
paper analyses recent accident data to identify the 
major hazards, root causes, and corrective actions for 
equipment failure incidents of the industry; and 
establishes lessons learned for better process 
equipment failure prevention. 
 
 
2.0  HISTORY OF LOSS PREVENTION IN THE CPI 
 
The history of accident prevention in the CPI shows that 
different approaches of risk reduction strategies have 
been implemented.  Previously, accident prevention 
emphasizes either on design, technical, or procedural 
strategies. In the 1800s, a CPI plant with little 
instrumentation and means of protection only 
emphasized on procedural aspects for accident 
prevention. One of the procedural risk reduction 
examples is the one-legged stool strategy in 
nitroglycerin production. In this case, the operators had 
to sit on one-legged stools while watching over the 
production of highly exothermic nitroglycerin in large-
stirred pots. If the heat was not removed by cooling and 
stirring, the reaction became uncontrollable and may 
lead to an explosive decomposition of the nitroglycerin.  
Hence, the operators had to watch the temperature 
closely. If they fell asleep, they fell off and injured 
themselves or at worst, could lead to fatality [6]. 
In 1960s, a great change in CPI occurred with process 
operating conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure etc.) 
became more severe; the energy stored in the process 
increased; problems in areas such as material 
construction and process control became more taxing; 
and the plants grew in size with a factor of about 10, 
and were often single stream. Relatively sophisticated 
instrumentation provision was developed to run a 
process under extreme conditions and close to the limits 
of safety thus causing high accident rates [7]. The focus 
of accident prevention shifted to technical and design-
oriented [8]. 
Later, from 1980s onwards, the trend in accident 
prevention was mostly utilizing the outer layers of 
protection by adding add-on engineered either 
passive or active; and procedural control strategies. 
However, the risk reduction approaches were only 
effective to a certain extent. Nowadays, the focus of 
loss prevention is human and organizational-related 
which emphasis on the safety management system 
and safety culture to overcome fluctuating accident 
rate issues as shown by the study conducted by 
Amyotte et al. with 42% of the recommended 
corrective actions was procedural safety. In the study, 
258 risk reduction strategies were identified. Inherently 
safer was the second highest (36%), followed by active-
engineered and passive-engineered controls which 
represented 14% and 8% of the overall hierarchy of 
controls, respectively. The accident rates however 
remain persistently high [9].  
 
 
3.0  RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
In this study, 50 comprehensive accident investigation 
reports from 1998 to 2012 were extracted from U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) 
and U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
database [10-11]. The baseline of the study was 2005. 
These accidents were related to equipment failures. 
Among the identified equipment were piping systems 
(32%), storage tanks (20%), process vessels (16%), 
separation equipment (10%), reactors (8%), and heat 
transfer equipment (8%). Others equipment such as 
conveyor and batch-off equipment only led to 6% of 
the reported accidents. 
Piping systems include piping and piping 
components such as flanges, expansion joints, gaskets, 
bolts, etc. In this study, the types of vessels considered 
were process vessels and storage tanks. Process vessels 
are used for processing tasks in a plant. Meanwhile, 
storage tanks are used to contain raw materials, 
products, by-product, waste, etc. and commonly 
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located outside the process plant area. Reactors are a 
unique subset of vessels since they are specifically 
designed to contain chemical reactions. Heat transfer 
equipment are shell and tube exchanger, air cooled 
exchanger, and direct contact exchangers. 
Meanwhile, centrifuges, filters, dust collectors, cyclones 
and electrostatic precipitators are considered as 
separation equipment [5].  
 
3.1  Major Hazards 
 
The industry has been known with its highly hazardous 
environment compared to other industries.  Many 
accidents happen in the CPI due to the existence of 
reactive/toxic chemicals and state-of-the-art 
technologies. The accidents commonly risk life and 
damage physical assets and its surrounding. Three 
major hazards in the CPI are fire, explosion and toxic 
release. Commonly, multiple major hazards occur 
resulting from an incident, leading to catastrophic 
disaster. In this study, consequence analysis was 
conducted to identify major hazards of equipment 
failure accidents and their severity in terms of fatality, 
injury, exposure, shelter-in-place and evacuation. 
 
3.2  Accident Contributors 
 
Root causes for the accidents were identified and 
classified as nature, human, organizational, technical, 
and design errors. Nature is an external factor in leading 
to accidents such as bad weather, earthquake, floods, 
lightning, tsunami, and landslides. Human errors are of 
four types; (1) errors due to slip or momentary lapse i.e. 
unintentional action, (2) errors due to poor training or 
instructions, (3) errors due to mismatch between the 
ability of the person and the requirement of the task, 
and (4) errors due to a deliberate not to follow 
instructions or accepted practice. Organizational errors 
are often related to management system. Design error 
is a part of technical errors.  
 However, due to its significant contribution in leading 
to accidents, a separate class for design errors was 
established. A design error is deemed to have occurred 
if the design or operating procedures are changed 
after an incident has occurred. Design errors are related 
to process condition, reactivity/incompatibility, 
unsuitable equipment/parts, and material of 
construction, sizing, utility set-up, protection, layout, 
automation /instrumentation, operating manual and 
fabrication/construction / installation [12]. 
Then, the origins of accident contributors were 
determined using root cause failures analysis by Antaki 
[13]. Root causes are originated from four major phases 
of a plant lifecycle; (a) risk reduction in materials, (b) risk 
reduction in design, (c) risk reduction in operation, and 
(d) risk reduction in maintenance. Risk is reduced in 
materials by selecting a good quality and compatible 
material. Risk reduction in design can be applied during 
process engineering and detailed engineering stages. 
To reduce risk in design, the basic control strategy 
should be established and all conditions such as start-
up, normal operation and emergency shut-downs have 
to be considered. Risk reduction in operation comprises 
of safety and environmental management systems, 
controls of the safety management system, accident 
and investigation, and operating procedures. 
Meanwhile, risk reduction in maintenance deals with 
permits to work, maintenance programs, and 
modification controls. In these categories, human 
resources and management are required to eliminate 
human errors by giving education and training, and 
improving communications among the personnel in the 
CPI [14]. 
 
3.3  Accident Contributors 
 
Finally, the recommended corrective actions were 
analyzed to identify the applied hierarchy of controls in 
the industry i.e. inherently safer, passive-engineered, 
active-engineered, or procedural. Ideally, accident 
preventive approach framework recommends 
inherently safer approach to deal with design errors and 
nature. For human and organizational causes, 
procedural approach is usually applied. Meanwhile, 
add-on engineering controls (i.e. passive and active-
engineered) are recommended for technical-related 
accidents. Based on the findings, several lessons 
learned are established for better accident prevention 
for the industry. 
 
 
4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, the analyses are divided into three major 
sub-sections; (1) consequence analysis, (2) root cause 
failures analysis, and (3) hierarchy of controls analysis. 
Root cause failure analysis was used to identify various 
types of accident contributors and determine their 
origins in process plant lifecycle. 
 
4.1  Consequence Analysis 
 
In the analysis, there were seven types of incidents 
resulted from 50 equipment failure-related accidents; 
fire (14%), explosion (22%), toxic release (26%), fire and 
explosion (32%), fire and toxic release (2%), explosion 
and toxic release (2%), and fire, explosion, and toxic 
release (2%). In total, 126 fatalities, 590 injuries, 260 
exposures, four shelter-in-place, and 13 evacuations 
were reported. Fire and explosion incidents were the 
most common type of incidents in the study with 60 
fatalities, 330 injuries, 18 exposures, two shelter-in-place, 
and four evacuations.  
 The second major hazards were toxic release 
incidents which resulted in seven fatalities, 22 injuries, 
242 exposures, a shelter-in-place, and four evacuations. 
Explosion incidents were less than fire and explosion, 
and toxic release incident but the number of reported 
fatalities were higher (36 people) and with 161 injuries, 
and an evacuation. Explosion incidents were followed 
by fire incidents. In the fire incidents, 21 people were 
killed, 77 were injured, and two evacuations were 
resumed. Other incidents i.e. fire and toxic release; 
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explosion and toxic release; and fire, explosion, and 
toxic release were less significant. Only two fatalities, a 
shelter-in-place, and two evacuations were reported 
for these three types of incidents. 
According to Table 1, piping system failures had 
initiated six fire, three explosion, and seven toxic release 
incidents. The number of reported fatalities, injuries, and 
exposures were 35, 150, and 71 people, respectively 
which were among the severe consequences 
compared to other failure accidents. The piping system 
failures also led to a shelter-in-place, and four 
evacuations.  
Piping system failures outnumbered other equipment 
failures in resulting fire incidents and toxic release 
incidents. Only one case was reported for fire and toxic 
release (due to storage tank failure), explosion and 
toxic release (due to process vessel failure), and fire, 
explosion, and toxic release incident (due to storage 
tank failure). Shelter-in-place was commonly 
associated with piping systems, process vessels, and 
separation equipment failures.  
Meanwhile, evacuation was reported in all 
equipment failures except others category. The highest 
evacuation was commenced during piping system 
failure accidents. The most catastrophic accident was 
related to separation equipment which occurred on 
March 23, 2005. The incident involved 16 fatalities, 180 
injuries, and a shelter-in-place due to fire and explosion. 
The root cause of the incident was ineffective oversight 
of the company’s safety culture and major accident 
prevention programs by the top management. This 
incident was one of six incidents which occurred due to 
a single root cause. The identified equipment failures 
were related to separation equipment (1), reactors (1), 
piping systems (2), process vessels (1), and heat transfer 
equipment (1). Most of the incidents were caused by a 
single organizational or design error as listed in Table 2.  
 
4.2  Root Cause Analysis 
 
Based on the root causes analysis, 137 accident 
contributors were identified with organizational errors as 
the major accident contributors (43%). Technical errors 
were identified as the second highest (25%) accident 
contributors, followed by design errors (23%), and 
human errors (9%). None of nature caused the 
accidents. Most of these accidents were contributed 
by multiple accident contributors. These multiple root 
causes accidents were classified as accidents with 
three or less accident contributors (64%) and accidents 
with more than three accident contributors  
(24%). Only 12% of the accidents were caused by one 
root cause. Among equipment failures that caused 
single accident contributor accidents were piping 
systems, reactors, process vessels, separation 
equipment, and heat transfer equipment (Figure 1 and 
Table 3).   
 The analysis showed that the average root causes 
per accident was 2.74. Separation equipment was the 
most accident-prone since only 2.4 root causes was 
required for an accident to occur. Although piping 
systems-related accidents were the highest but their 
root causes per accident was 2.75, same as for the heat 
transfer equipment. This indicates that piping systems 
and heat transfer equipment were less prompted to 
accident compared to separation equipment (2.4), 
process vessels (2.5), and reactors (2.5) which had been 
initiated by less number of root causes. Storage tanks 
(2.9) and other equipment (3.67) failure accidents 
occurred less than other accidents since the failures 
required more accident contributors to initiate (Table 
1). Classification of types of root causes and their origins 
is summarized in Figure 2.  
In the study, origins of accident contributors were 
grouped into three phases; design (i.e. materials and 
design), operation, and maintenance. At the design 
phase, most root causes are due to material selection, 
material quality, basic system design, and detailed 
integrity design. Instrumentation and controls, 
procedures and training, and emergency response-
related root causes are commonly originated during 
the operation phase. Finally, during the maintenance 
phase, risk-bases inspection and fitness-for-service and 
management of change are considered as the main 
originated accident contributors.  
All the design errors were originated at the design 
phase meanwhile all the human errors occurred during 
the operation stage. Other errors such as organizational 
errors and technical were originated at multiple phases 
of the plant cycle. Based on the origin cause analysis, 
critical criteria for accident prevention strategies are 
established as shown in Table 4. The results can be used 
to identify and diagnose equipment failure problems 
before progressing into unexpected downtime or 
catastrophic accidents as promptly finding the root 
causes not only save costly damage to the system, but 
also dramatically reduces operational costs. 
 
4.2.1  Piping Systems 
 
In the research, piping systems caused the highest 
percentage of accidents. Special considerations for 
piping systems are blockage in the relief path; 
deflagration to detonation transition in pipe lines, loss of 
containment, and thermal stresses.5 Among the 
identified piping system root causes were deficient 
integrity management procedures to detect defected 
pipe section, inadequate quality assurance and quality 
control, unreliable maintenance software program, 
and did not provide a back-up method to ensure timely 
change-out of piping components. Two piping systems 
accidents were initiated with only a single design error. 
This shows the significant of design errors in leading to 
accidents related to piping systems.  Organizational 
and technical errors contributed to most of the piping 
systems accidents.
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Table 1 Consequence Analysis based on Equipment Failures 
Type of Equipment 
Failures 
 
 
 
 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
In
c
id
e
n
ts
 
R
o
o
t 
C
a
u
se
s 
p
e
r 
In
c
id
e
n
t 
Type of Incident Severity of Incident 
F
ir
e
 
E
x
p
lo
si
o
n
 
To
x
ic
 R
e
le
a
se
 
F
ir
e
 &
 E
x
p
lo
si
o
n
 
F
ir
e
 &
 T
o
x
ic
 R
e
le
a
se
 
E
x
p
lo
si
o
n
 &
 T
o
x
ic
 R
e
le
a
se
 
F
ir
e
, 
E
x
p
lo
si
o
n
 &
 T
o
x
ic
 R
e
le
a
se
 
Fa
ta
lit
y
 
In
ju
ry
 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 
S
h
e
lt
e
r-
in
-p
la
c
e
 
E
v
a
c
u
a
ti
o
n
 
Piping Systems 16 2.75 6 3 7 - - - - 35 150 71 1 4 
Storage Tanks 10 2.90 - 2 2 4 1 - 1 17 13 0 0 2 
Process Vessels 8 2.50 - 2 1 4 - 1 - 14 60 16 1 3 
Separation Equipment 5 2.40 - 1 1 3 - - - 17 191 19 2 1 
Reactors 4 2.50 - 1 1 2 - - - 9 49 154 0 1 
Heat Transfer Equipment 4 2.75 1 1 1 1 - - - 9 52 0 0 2 
Others 3 3.67 - 1 - 2 - - - 25 75 0 0 0 
Total 50 2.74 7 11 13 16 1 1 1 126 590 260 4 13 
 
Table 2 Details on Single Root Cause Equipment Failures 
Single Root Cause Accidents 
Type of Failures Type of Incidents Severity of Incidents Type of Errors 
Separation Equipment Fire and Explosion 16 fatalities, 180 injuries, shelter-in-place Organizational 
Reactors Explosion 4 fatalities, 32 injuries Design 
Piping Systems Explosion 4 fatalities, 11 injuries Design 
Piping Systems Fire 2 fatalities, 7 injuries Design 
Process Vessels Toxic Release 16 exposures, evacuation Design 
Heat Transfer Equipment Toxic Release 7 injuries Organizational 
 
Figure 1 Type of Root Causes 
12%
64%
24%
Single
3 or less
more than 3
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Table 3 Single Root Cause Accidents 
Type of Equipment Failures Type of Errors Origin of Errors 
Reactors Design Design 
Separation Equipment Organizational Operation 
Process Vessels Design Design 
Heat Transfer Equipment Organizational Operation 
Piping Systems Design Design 
Piping Systems Design Design 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 Origins of Accident Contributors 
 
 
Table 4 Distributions of Critical Criteria for Accident Prevention 
 
CRITICAL CRITERIA FOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Design (43%) Operation (39%) Maintenance 
(18%) 
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Mechanical 
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Safeguards 
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22
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and 
experience 
15
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25
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safer 
12
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Public 
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13
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and 
auditing 
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13
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Safe 
operating 
limits 
3% 
Operating 
procedures 
11
% 
Housekeepi
ng 
practices 
4% 
  
Emergency 
preparedn
ess 
9%   
 
4.2.2  Process Vessels and Storage Tanks 
 
Vessels can be classified into in-process vessels (surge 
drums, accumulators, separators, etc.) and storage 
tanks. Common failures involving vessels are regarding 
ignition of flammable atmosphere; chemical reaction 
increases pressure; pressure generated by rollover; tank 
failure under vacuum; and tank failure from heave 
[5].Storage tanks accidents were higher than process 
vessels accidents. Storage tanks accidents were 
caused mainly by organizational errors, followed by 
design and human errors. Inadequate mechanical 
integrity management system to prevent and address 
safety and environmental hazards; and inadequate 
engineering management and management of 
change were among the identified organizational 
errors resulting in storage tank failures. Other storage 
tank failure factors were inadequate training and 
practices in determining and handling abnormal 
cylinders, and employees were unaware of the 
potential flammability hazard, and inadequate safety 
measures in place to identify and analyze serious fire 
hazards that could affect the tanks.  Process vessels 
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failures were also caused by organizational errors 
related to ineffective process and engineering 
requirement programs, inadequate hazard analysis 
systems, and inadequate operating procedures or 
training programs. A single root cause accidents 
occurred involving a process vessel which were caused 
by a design error leading to toxic release. However, no 
fatalities and injuries were reported. 
 
4.2.3  Reactors 
 
Reactors are a unique subset of vessels since they are 
specifically designed to contain chemical reactions. 
However, many of the generic failure modes of vessels 
such as corrosion-related failures or auto polymerization 
may also apply to reactors. Reactors can be grouped 
into three main types: batch, semi-batch, and 
continuous. To avoid accidents, special emphases of 
reactor design are on overpressure due to loss of 
agitation, addition of incorrect reactant, inactive/semi-
active or wrong catalyst addition, and monomer 
emulsion feed breaking during feed [5]. The analysis 
found out that organizational errors significantly 
contributed to reactor failures which then led to 
accidents e.g. top management did not have provide 
effective oversight of the company’s safety culture and 
major accident prevention programs, and did not have 
adequate  emergency response plan. Other than these 
management-related errors, design errors also 
constituted to reactor failure due to ignorance to 
perform a comprehensive process design and hazard 
review of the laboratory scale-up to full production 
before attempting the first chemical production batch. 
In this study, a single design error had contributed to an 
occurrence of reactor accident that led to an 
explosion. The explosion killed four people and injured 
32 others. 
 
4.2.4  Separation Equipment 
 
Based on histories, separation equipment is known to 
lead to explosions such as batch centrifuge explosion, 
filter explosion, and dust collector explosion. The main 
issue for this equipment is dust deflagration due to 
electrostatic spark discharge [5]. Based on the root 
cause analysis, most separation equipment failures 
were caused by organizational errors. Others were 
initiated by technical and design errors. Among the 
identified organizational errors were due to no formal, 
documented program to investigate and implement 
corrective action for incidents, no procedures for 
identifying and planning of non-routine job situations, 
no adequate system to identify and evaluate the 
hazards created by changes to the facility processes 
and equipment, and insufficient layers of protection to 
prevent a catastrophic release. A single organizational 
error originated during the operation phase had 
caused a separation equipment accident that led to 
fire and explosion. The incident killed 16 people and 
injured 180 others. 
 
 
4.2.5  Heat Transfer Equipment 
 
Past incidents involving heat transfer equipment are 
ethylene oxide re-distillation column explosion (i.e. 
Seadrift, Texas chemical facility in 1991), brittle fracture 
of a heat exchanger, and cold box explosion. Among 
heat transfer equipment are shell and tube exchanger, 
air cooled exchanger, direct contact exchanger, and 
other types including helical, spiral, plate and frame, 
and carbon block exchangers. Common accident 
contributors for heat transfer equipment are 
leak/rupture of the heat transfer surface, fouling or 
accumulation of non-condensable gases, and external 
fire [5] In the analysis, the most common root causes of 
accidents involving heat transfer equipment were 
organizational-based e.g. inefficient cleaning 
procedures, incomplete incident investigation 
program, inadequate management systems for 
supervision, planning, and execution of maintenance 
work, and lack of system for monitoring and controlling 
hazards. A toxic release incident had occurred due to 
a single organizational accident contributor. 
 
4.3  Hierarchy of Controls Analysis 
 
In managing risk, the most reliable layers of protection 
(LOP) is the inner most layer which is the inherently safer, 
followed by passive-engineered, active-engineered, 
and procedural strategies, respectively. The priority in 
risk management strategy is inherently safer > passive > 
active > procedural. By changing the design an 
operation at the earlier stages, the capital and 
operating costs required are much cheaper than the 
latter stages. Only, procedural control strategies require 
low relative costs compared to other stages but the 
reliability of the strategies is the lowest and the 
modification is difficult to mark since the complexity 
increases throughout the process lifecycle [5].The 
corrective action section of the accident reports was 
analyzed to determine the applied risk reduction 
strategies of the CPI. The analysis has showed that the 
industry normally takes several corrective actions for 
multiple causation accidents. However, procedural 
strategies were mostly recommended as the corrective 
actions.  In this study, 590 corrective actions had been 
suggested by the boards. Out of these 590 corrective 
actions, 91% were procedural-based. From all the 
recommended corrective actions, active-engineered 
was 3%, and followed by inherently safer (3%). Passive-
engineered strategies were the least options used with 
only 3% of the total recommended corrective actions. 
Further details on the recommended hierarchy of 
controls are summarized in Table 5. 
 
4.3.1  Inherently Safer 
 
Process hazards and their risks can be managed 
effectively through layer of protection. The hierarchy 
controls analysis by the research has showed that 
procedural strategies were most preferred by the 
industry. The layer is less reliable than inherent safety, 
passive-engineered, and active-engineered controls.5 
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Inherently safer is the premier strategy for hazard 
avoidance and control at its source through design 
changes. Based on the analysis, 3% of the corrective 
actions were inherently safer strategies. Inherently safer 
approach uses material and process conditions that 
are less hazardous to eliminate and mitigate hazard. 
Four types of inherently safer used were minimization 
(44%), moderation (28%), simplification (17%), and 
substitution (11%).  Minimization was used to limit energy 
generation capabilities by using smaller amount of 
hazardous substances. Among others recommended 
inherently safer strategies were replacing a hazardous 
substance with a less hazardous one such as the use of 
air or pigging with air instead of natural gas blow for 
cleaning fuel gas piping (substitution) and sodium 
hypochlorite as a biocide in cooling water treatment 
instead of chlorine (substitution); and the use of 
appropriate materials for wastewater treatment 
(moderation), and revision of operating conditions to 
reduce risk of over-chlorination (moderation) for safer 
process condition. 
 
4.3.2 Add-on Engineering Controls 
 
Add-on layers are mainly installed as passive and active 
engineered safety protection systems. Passive strategy 
employs systems that remain static and do not perform 
any fundamental operations. This passive-engineered 
risk control further reduces the likelihood and 
consequences of accident by using passive safety 
protection such as dikes, containment and fire wall. The 
passive-engineered modifications are mostly related to 
layout, mechanical/physical aspects, design 
specification changes,  
 
 
 
 
additional equipment, equipment modification, and 
friendlier design. Active add-on engineered strategies 
use active systems that depend on timely hazard 
detection and initiation (i.e. utilizes safety devices that 
respond to process changes) to further reduces the 
accidents using relief valves, controllers, detectors 
and alarms. For controlling risk, active-engineered 
control requires additional devices to sense and 
indicates process variables, valves, etc. either by 
adding or removing the instrumentation and 
automation of the equipment [12]. 
In the study, 3% passive-engineered controls were 
used and 3% were active-engineered controls. For 
passive-engineered, protective system (60%), design 
changes (13%), layout (7%), sizing (7%), equipment 
modification (7%), and additional equipment (7%) 
were recommended. Passive-engineered controls 
further reduced hazard and risk by using firewalls and 
blast-resistant construction; adding protective 
fireproofing for fire rack support steel near process unit 
containing highly pressurized flammables; and 
ensuring that penetrations of partitions, floors, walls, 
and ceiling were sealed dust-tight. Meanwhile, 
instrumentations were mostly used as active-
engineered controls (i.e. 55%). Other active-
engineered controls were mitigation system (30%), 
and enhanced protective system (15%). Active-
engineered controls established adequate layers of 
 
Table 5 Classifications for the Recommended Hierarchy of Controls 
 
HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS (%) 
Inherently Safer (3%) 
Passive-Engineered 
(3%) 
Active-Engineered (3%) Procedural (91%) 
Minimization 44 
Protective 
system 
60 Instrumentation 55 Communication 23 
Moderation 28 
Design 
changes 
13 
Mitigation 
system 
30 Safety regulations and guidance 15 
Simplificatio
n 
17 Layout 7 
Protective 
system 
15 Training and education 13 
Substitution 11 Sizing 7 
 
Inspection 11 
 
Equipment 
modification 
7 Management system 10 
Additional 
equipment 
7 Emergency preparedness 5 
 
Work mechanism 5 
Documentation 3 
Enforcement and implementation 3 
Cooperation 2 
Expertise and consultation 2 
Management of change 2 
Maintenance 2 
Monitoring and supervision 1 
Research 1 
Contractor safety performance 1 
Cleaning and housekeeping 1 
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protection system by using additional interlock and 
shutdown, air monitoring devices, automated audible 
alarms, level indicators, automatic controls, post-
ignition deflagration detection, and damage control 
devices. 
 
4.3.3  Procedural 
 
Procedural or human and organizational-oriented risk 
control usually focuses on safe operation including 
training, supervision, procedure, work instructions, 
inspection and maintenance. This operator and 
maintenance procedures should be the last resort, 
especially for control and mitigation where the 
chance of errors or failure is high [12]. In the study, 
procedural safety systems were commonly related to 
administrative controls that include standard 
operating procedures, safety rules and procedures, 
operator training, management systems, and 
emergency response procedures. The procedural 
strategies were 91% of all the corrective actions 
suggested. Communication was the highest strategies 
recommended by the boards (22.9%), followed by 
development or amendment of safety regulations 
and guidance (15.3%). Training and education 
(12.7%), inspection (11.5%), and management system 
(10.1%) were also parts of these implemented 
corrective actions. Other less prioritized procedural 
strategies were emergency preparedness (5.4%), work 
mechanism (4.8%), documentation (3.2%), 
enforcement/implementation (2.6%), cooperation 
(2.4%), expertise and consultation (2%), management 
of change (1.9%), maintenance (1.5%), 
monitoring/supervision (1.1%), research (1.1.%), 
contractor safety performance (0.9%), and cleaning 
and housekeeping (0.6%). In the study, 
communication issues were commonly addressed to 
ensure timely transmission of critical safety information 
to responding personnel. Therefore, safety alerts and 
health bulletin were published to warn owners and 
operators on potential hazards and risks of the 
industry. The safety alerts advised them on their 
responsibilities for accident prevention such as 
recommending the use of inherently safer design 
features, describing sufficient security measures, and 
recommending the use of hazards signs to identify the 
fire and explosion hazards.  
 
 
5.0  LESSONS LEARNED 
 
From the analyses, the contribution of process 
equipment failures in leading to accidents of the CPI 
is significant. Many lessons learned can be established 
based on the analyses of major hazards, root causes, 
and the recommended corrective actions. Among 
the lessons learned are:  
 
 
 
 
5.1  Worst-case Scenario Design 
 
Equipment process failures result in major hazards and 
their severity is beyond limitations. It is infrequently 
reported that only a type of incident happened per 
equipment failure i.e. only fire or explosion or toxic 
release incident occurs. In most accident cases, fire, 
explosion, and/or toxic release incidents occur 
simultaneously. The synergy between major hazards 
results in catastrophic accidents with severe 
consequences in numbers of fatalities, injuries, 
exposures, shelter-in-place, and evacuations. To 
minimize the losses, plant and equipment should be 
designed and prepared for the worst-case scenario, 
not just adapting to any ‘applicable’ standards or 
guidance.  
 
5.2  Hierarchy of Controls Implementation 
 
In the study, the required Management Preventive 
Actions (MPA) was 52.6% whereby human errors and 
organizational errors constituted 9.5% and 43.1%, 
respectively. Based on technical and design errors 
identified, 47.5% of the root causes required 
Engineering Preventive Actions (EPA). Although the 
amounts of both preventive actions were almost 
balanced, the Boards only recommended 9% of the 
corrective actions in terms of technical and design 
aspect. Most often procedural strategies were 
applied. These results show the need for more 
balanced accident prevention strategies for the CPI. 
The industry should shift its accident prevention 
approach towards technical and design, not just 
emphasizing on procedural aspects. Integrated 
accident prevention should be the focus of the 
industry nowadays to eliminate hazards and reduce 
risks. In general, the emphasis on procedural accident 
prevention strategies does not provide adequate 
hazard elimination and risk reduction. The human 
reliability is not high enough and often leads to 
improper problem-solving, inappropriate actions, and 
ill-timed responses. Thus, the CSB and NTSB suggested 
various procedural corrective actions with the 
involvement of governmental agencies, industry 
players, research institutes, and other non-
governmental agencies. Thus, the industry should 
reconsider the implementation of the inner most layers 
of hierarchy of controls to prevent accidents thus 
resulting in safety and cost benefits of the CPI. The 
importance of implementing a comprehensive 
hierarchy of controls includes, 
 
 To comprehensively control all potential 
ignition sources and continuously monitor 
hazards at appropriate locations and 
elevations; 
 To train and certify emergency response 
personnel;  
 To publish the technical guidance addressing 
the safe operating procedures; 
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 To avoid occurrence and recurrence of 
accidents by analyzing the key findings, 
cause, recommendations of the reports to 
shareholders, membership, and workforce; 
and 
 To establish a timely notification community 
procedures in the event of chemical release 
that save life and public properties. 
 
5.3  Communication and Cooperation 
 
Communication is the major factors to prevent 
occurrence and recurrence of accidents. Any 
miscommunications among responsible agencies and 
the industry players should be avoided especially 
during emergency response procedures. Moreover, 
good community notification systems for any 
emergencies would also save near-by public life and 
properties. Accident knowledge generated from 
accident investigations should be communicated 
thoroughly for better accident prevention of the 
industry. Additionally, the establishment of safety 
regulations and guidance are also important in 
preventing accidents. Several governmental 
agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA), and other regulatory bodies are responsible 
for developing, revising, and regulating safety 
regulations of the CPI. At the industry level, top 
management and middle management are in-
charged for establishing and enforcing these safety 
regulations and guidance. Cooperation between the 
agencies, industry players, and the workforce are 
needed to ensure comprehensive regulations and 
standards are adapted in the CPI.  
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
As a conclusion, most accidents due to equipment 
failures could be prevented by incorporating worst-
case scenario design, balanced and integrated 
hierarchy of controls, and comprehensive 
communication systems in the industry. Cooperation 
between various agencies, industry players, and the 
public is required to disseminate lessons learned and 
promote safety in the CPI. 
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